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On December 12, 1980, President Carter signed into law the Patent
and Trademark Laws Act' which provides, for the first time, proce-
dures for the reexamination of issued United States patents. President
Carter stated at that time that:
The patent reexamination procedures established by this legisla-
tion constitute the most significant improvement in our patent laws
in more than a century. Under these procedures, during the life of an
issued patent any interested person for example, a patent owner, a
potential licensee, or a competitor-may obtain a prompt and rela-
tively inexpensive reevaluation of its validity by the Patent and
Trademark Office. Patent reexamination will make it possible to fo-
cus extra attention on the most commercially significant patents.
This legislation will improve the reliability of reexamined patents,
thereby reducing the costs and uncertainties of testing patent validity
in the courts. The provisions of this legislation will result in less cost
to the public for patent reexamination.
2
Thus, "It]he most significant improvement in our patent laws in
more than a century" was born.3 The patent bar rejoiced, having long
sought to improve the reliability of issued patents as a way of spurring
innovation in this country.4
On reflection, however, it appears that reexamination may fail to
* J.D., Albany Law School of Union University. The author is a partner with Neuman,
Williams, Anderson & Olson of Chicago, I11.
1. Patent and Trademark Laws Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 301-307, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (to
be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307).
2. Patent and Trademark System Reform, 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 2803 (Dec. 12,
1980).
3. The history of the efforts leading to the passage of the Patent and Trademark Laws Act is
summarized in an article written by Donald J. Quigg, a member of the ABA Subcommittee that
formulated the reexamination procedure embodied in the statute. See Quigg, Post-Issuance Re-
Examination: An Inventive Attempt at Reform, Nat'l L. J., June 1, 1981, at 31, col. 1 [hereinafter
referred to as Quigg]. For further discussion of the history of the reexamination proposals, see
Abramson, Should The U.S. Adopt A Re-examination System?, 52 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 407 (1970);
Daus, Reexamination: An Opportunity to Serve The Public, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 180 (1980); Irons
& Sears, Patent "'Reexamination." A Case of Administrative Arrogation, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 287,
290-91 (1980); Marquis, Improving the Quality Controlfor Patents, 59 MINN. L. REv. 67, 84-90
(1974); Popovich, Patent Quality. An Analysis of Proposed Court, Legislative, and PTO-Administra-
tive Reform-Reexamination Resurrected, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 248, 316 (1979).
4. The high hope with which the bar views reexamination is readily apparent from com-
ments recently published in periodicals across the country. See, e.g., Kaberon, New Patent Law
Becomes Effective Today, The Chicago Law Bulletin, July 1, 1981, at 1, col. 3; Quigg, supra note 3,
at 31, col. I ("Overall, the new legislation should benefit the Patent and Trademark Office and
help to improve innovation-from concept to commercialization of inventions--in the United
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perform its intended function of improving the reliability of issued pat-
ents.5 The reasons for this potential failure lie in how the reexamina-
tion statute and the related Rules of Practice promulgated by the Patent
and Trademark Office ("the Office") are likely to be interpreted in light
of existing precedent. The reexamination procedure is strictly exparte
and this prevents binding finality from attaching to the outcome of a
reexamination under resyudicata or collateral estoppel. Also, the appli-
cability of the statutory presumption of validity that attaches to an is-
sued patent 6 with respect to newly cited prior art considered in a
reexamination will have to be shaped by the courts, particularly as to
extending the protection of that presumption to the denial of a request
for reexamination.
7
This article reviews the reexamination statute and its related rules
and applies to them the principal authorities bearing on the issue of
finality under the alternative theories of resjudicata, collateral estoppel,
and the presumption of validity. From this analysis, suggestions
emerge for amending the statute and Office rules to ensure some meas-
ure of finality for the reexamination procedure. In this manner, the
desired increase in the reliability of issued patents can be attained.
PATENTABILITY AND THE PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
The granting of a United States patent is governed by title 35 of
the United States Code, which was enacted by the Patent Act of 1952.8
Essentially, three requirements are established by the statute for patent-
ability: the subject matter of a claimed invention must be useful, novel
and nonobvious.9 Explanation and application of these requirements is
States"); COMMITTEE REPORT OF THE PATENT REEXAMINATION SUBCOMMITTEE, AMERICAN PAT-
ENT LAW ASSOCIATION BULLETIN 150-51 (March-April 1981).
5. For detailed commentaries by other members of the patent bar on the course reexamina-
tion should now take, as well as a detailed review of its history, see VIRGINIA STATE BAR SECTION
ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT LAW, REEXAMINATION PROCEEDINGS (1981).
6. See text accompanying note 21 infra.
7. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-303 (West Sp. Supp. 1980). For a discussion of the scope of prior
art considered in a reexamination, see text accompanying note 33 infra.
8. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976 & Supp.
Ill)).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) provides:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless--
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or de-
scribed in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent, or
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found in a long and continuing line of case precedent. The landmark
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere
Co. io contains both interpretative and directive language concerning
the determination of whether the subject of a claimed invention is
nonobvious:
[T~he scope and content of the prior art is to be determined; differ-
ences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascer-
tained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.
Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the
subject matter is determined."I
As indicated by Graham, central to the determination of whether the
subject matter of a claimed invention is patentable is establishing the
scope and content of the relevant prior art' 2 and then gauging the nov-
elty and nonobviousness of the claimed invention against this
benchmark.
This determination is made by Office examiners during the exami-
nation of patent applications. Patent applications are examined ex
parte by the Office with the inventor in confidence and secrecy.' 3 Prior
art materials are assembled by an examiner by searching through
United States and foreign patents and may include a review of scien-
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented by the applicant or his
legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the application
for patent in this country on an application filed more than twelve months before the
filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by
another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for pat-
ent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country
by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority
of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and
reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was
first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the
other.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
See generally I D. CHISUM, PATENTS, § 3.01 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as CHIsUM].
10. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
11. Id at 17.
12. "Prior art" is generally defined by 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). See note 9 supra. See gener-
ally 1 CHISUM, supra note 9, §§ 3.01-.08; 2 CHIsuM, §§ 5.03[1]-[3], 6.01-.04.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976). See generally 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.570 (1981).
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tific journals and other works and periodicals, both foreign and domes-
tic. 14  The search is presently conducted manually by an examiner,
through copies of these materials on file in the Office.15
Provisions also exist for the correction of inadvertent errors in an
issued patent by reissuing it.16 The error will typically involve a defec-
tive specification or drawing, or the scope of the patent being overly
broad or unduly narrow.' 7 The same standards of patentability used to
evaluate original patent applications are applied to a reissue applica-
tion.' 8 The patentee may retain the same rights in the reissued patent
as if the patent had been originally issued in its amended reissued
form.'
9
Should an infringement suit be brought on an issued patent, the
provisions of section 282 come into play.20 On the one hand, this sec-
tion provides for a presumption of validity for the issued patent.2 1 On
the other hand, the section permits the invalidity of the patent to be
raised as a defense to such a suit.2 2 As a result, a patent's satisfaction of
patentability standards is subjected to intense scrutiny in litigation.
14. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (1981).
15. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9 (1976).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1976); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.171-.179 (1981).
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1976).
18. Id
19. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (1976).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976) provides:
A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in independent,
dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the
validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid
even though dependent upon an invalid claim. The burden of establishing invalidity of
a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement
of a patent and shall be pleaded:
(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability,
(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part
II of this title as a condition for patentability,
(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any
requirement of sections 112 or 251 of this title,
(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title.
In actions involving the validity or infringement of a patent the party asserting inva-
lidity or noninfringement shall give notice in the pleadings or otherwise in writing to the
adverse party at least thirty days before the trial, of the country, number, date, and name
of the patentee of any patent, the title, date, and page numbers of any publication to be
relied upon as anticipation of the patent in suit or, except in actions in the United States
Court of Claims, as showing the state of the art, and the name and address of any person
who may be relied upon as the prior inventor or as having prior knowledge of or as
having previously used or offered for sale the invention of the patent in suit. In the
absence of such notice proof of the said matters may not be made at the trial except on
such terms as the court requires.
See generally 4 CHISUM, supra note 9, §§ 19.01, 19.02[1].
21. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976).
22. Id
REEXAMINATION
Unburdened by the time pressures felt by Office examiners, by incom-
plete Office search files, and by limited access to the bulk of scientific
and technical literature, infringement defendants often unearth rele-
vant prior art materials not considered during the exparte examination
of the patent in suit. Such newly uncovered prior art not infrequently
results in the invalidation of the patent in suit.
This lack of certainty as to the validity of issued patents gave rise
to considerable concern on the part of the patent bar and the courts.
23
The Office responded to this concern by amending the reissue proce-
dure to permit a party other than a patentee to challenge the validity of
a patent in the course of the proceeding. 24 It was hoped that this
change would produce greater stability and certainty for reissued pat-
ents.25 However, a broader response to the problem of patent instabil-
ity came to be viewed as necessary and this engendered congressional
action in the form of the reexamination procedure.
26
THE REEXAMINATION PROCEDURE
Sections 301 through 307 of the Patent and Trademark Laws Act,
23. See notes 3-5 supra.
24. See 42 Fed. Reg. 5594 (1977). Compare 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.11(b), .175, .291 (1976) (amended
1977) with 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.11(b), .175, .291 (1981).
Detailed discussions of the governing rules and procedures involved in executing a reissue
and protesting such a reissue are found in U.S. OFFICE OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS, MANUAL
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES chs. 1400, 1900 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as the
MPEP. The limits of such protestor participation, assuming access to the application, are set out
in MPEP, supra, §§ 1901.07(a)-(c), 1902-07, and basically comprise the receipt of copies of papers
filed by the reissue applicant, a comment period in which opposing papers may be filed, participa-
tion in interparies interviews (with the ability to request such an interview f the applicant agrees
to attend), and participation before the Board of Appeals in appeals taken by the applicant. The
protestor cannot appeal a decision to the Board adverse to the protestor. MPEP, supra, § 1904,
para. 1.
25. See promulgating remarks at 951 OFFICIAL GAz. PAT. OFF. 211 (1976); 955 OFFICIAL
GAZ. PAT. OFF. 216 (1977); 977 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 11 (1978).
26. The House committee report on the reexamination procedure stated:
This new procedure will permit any party to petition the patent office to review the
efficacy of a patent, subsequent to its issuance, on the basis of new information about
preexisting technology which may have escaped review at the time of the initial exami-
nation of the patent application. Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of ques-
tions about the validity of issued patents without recourse to expensive and lengthy
infringement litigation. This, in turn, will promote industrial innovation by assuring the
kind of certainty about patent validity which is a necessary ingredient of sound invest-
ment decisions.
A new patent reexamination procedure is needed to permit the owner of a patent to
have the validity of his patent tested in the Patent Office where the most expert opinions
exist and at a much reduced cost. Patent office reexamination will greatly reduce, if not
end, the threat of legal costs being used to 'blackmail' such holders into allowing patent
infringements or being forced to license their patents for nominal fees.
H.R. Rep. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1980), reprintedin [19801 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6460, 6462-63 [hereinafter referred to as House Report].
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together with the rules promulgated by the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice,27 establish the procedures for reexamining an issued United States
patent. 28
Any person may cite to the Office certain prior art materials be-
lieved to have a bearing on the patentability of an issued patent. Al-
though not required, if a written explanation of the pertinency of the
cited prior art to the patent is provided, the cited art and the explana-
tion are made part of the patent file; no reexamination need be re-
quested to cause the cited art to be made of record. 29 Alternatively, a
written request for a reexamination may be filed by anyone at any time
during the life of the patent. The request must state the pertinency of
the cited art to the patent at issue and show the manner of applying the
cited art to every claim of the patent for which reexamination is
sought. 30 The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks may also in-
stitute a reexamination on his own initiative.
31
Within three months of the receipt of a reexamination request, the
27. The rules as enacted appear at 46 Fed. Reg. 29176 (1981) and 1007 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT.
OFF. 30 (1981). The proposed rules appear at 46 Fed. Reg. 3126 (1981).
28. See generally 3 CHISUM, supra note 9, § 11.07[4]; Daus, Reexamination of US. Patents
Under The New Legislation, 79 PAT. & T. M. REV. 167 (1981).
29. 35 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West Sp. Supp. 1980) provides:
Any person at any time may cite to the Office in writing prior art consisting of
patents or printed publications which that person believes to have a bearing on the pat-
entability of any claim of a particular patent. If the person explains in writing the perti-
nency and manner of applying such prior art to at least one claim of the patent, the
citation of such prior art and the explanation thereof will become a part of the official file
of the patent. At the written request of the person citing the prior art, his or her identity
will be excluded from the patent file and kept confidential.
See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.501 (1981).
30. 35 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Sp. Supp. 1980) provides:
Any person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the Office of any
claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of section 301 of
this title. The request must be in writing and must be accompanied by payment of a
reexamination fee established by the Commissioner of Patents pursuant to the provisions
of section 41 of this title. The request must set forth the pertinency and manner applying
cited prior art to every claim for which reexamination is requested. Unless the request-
ing person is the owner of the patent, the Commissioner promptly will send a copy of the
request to the owner of record of the patent.
See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.510 (1981).
31. 35 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (West Sp. Supp. 1980) provides in part:
On his own initiative, and at any time, the Commissioner may determine whether a
substantial new question of patentability is raised by patents and publications discovered
by him or cited under the provisions of section 301 of this title.
See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (1981). Without this explicit statutory grant of authority, McCormick
Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606 (1898), would arguably have prevented such a
sua sponte exercise on the Commissioner's part. In McCormick, a patent owner sought reissue of
his patent but after the examiner denied some of the claims in the original patent, the owner
abandoned the reissue proceeding. The Court held that the owner held a valid patent as originally
issued because the Office had lost jurisdiction over the patent when it originally issued it and had
not regained such jurisdiction by virtue of the owner's initiation of the reissue proceeding.
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Commissioner determines whether a "substantial new question of pat-
entability" is raised by the request. 32 In making this determination, the
Commissioner need only consider patents or printed publications
newly cited to the Office alone, though he may also consider other pat-
ents or printed publications.33
If the Commissioner determines that no substantial new question
of patentability exists, his decision is final and nonappealable. 34 If the
request raises a substantial new question of patentability, an order for
reexamination is entered by the Commissioner for resolution of the
question. The patent owner, within not less than two months from
Commissioner's order, may file a statement on the new question of pat-
entability. If the owner files such a statement, and he is not the re-
quester of the reexamination, the third party requester then has two
months to submit a reply to the owner's statement.3 5 Reexamination
32. Neither the statute nor the Office rules elaborate on what is a "substantial new question
of patentability." The statute's legislative history is also devoid of comment on the intended rigor
of the standard established by this phrase. See House Report, supra note 26, at 6, 7.
33. 35 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (West Sp. Supp. 1980) provides in part:
Within three months following the filing of a request for reexamination under the
provisions of section 302 of this title, the Commissioner will determine whether a sub-
stantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent concerned is
raised by the request, with or without consideration of other patents or printed
publications.
See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.515 (1981).
34. 35 U.S.C.A. § 303(c) (West Sp. Supp. 1980) provides in part:
A determination by the Commissioner pursuant to subsection (a) of this section that
no substantial new question of patentability has been raised will be final and
nonappealable.
See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(c) (1981) where the examiner's decision on the reexamination request is
reviewable by petition to the Commissioner pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.181 (1981).
The language of rule 515(c) appears to conflict with the letter of section 303(c); however, the
statute indicates that the determination is to be made within three months of the request and is
final when made, yet the rule states that the determination is not final and nonappealable until the
one month time period for petitioning has run. If the original decision is not handed down until
after the end of the second month following the filing of the request, the period for finality will
extend past three months, in derogation of the statutory language. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (West
Sp. Supp. 1980) ("within three months following the filing of a request for reexamination.., the
Commissioner will determine...").
In addition, there are extremely rigorous acceptance standards applied to rule 1.181 petitions,
and no hearing is provided as a matter of right. See Anderson v. Lowry, 1899 C.D. 230, 235
(Com'r Pats. 1899); Scinta v. Anderson, 193 F.2d 1020, 1021-22 (C.C.P.A. 1951); Steierman v.
Connelly, 197 U.S.P.Q. 288, 289 (Com'r Pats. 1976); C. RivISE & A. CAESAR, INTERFERENCE LAW
& PRACTICE § 303 (1940); IA L. HoRwiTz, PATENT OFFICE RULES AND PRACTICE, §§ 181.2, .5
(1980).
35. 35 U.S.C.A. § 304 (West Sp. Supp. 1980) provides:
If, in a determination made under the provisions of subsection 303(a) of this title,
the Commissioner finds that a substantial new question of patentability affecting any
claim of a patent is raised, the determination will include an order for reexamination of
the patent for resolution of the question. The patent owner will be given a reasonable
period, not less than two months from the date a copy of the determination is given or
mailed to him, within which he may file a statement on such question, including any
amendment to his patent and new claim or claims he may wish to propose, for considera-
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thereafter generally proceeds in the same exparte manner as an origi-
nal application. 3
6
The outcome of a reexamination may be that the patent is found
valid in its original form, that the original patent is modified and as
such is found valid, or that the patent is found invalid. The patent
owner may seek both administrative and judicial review of the reexam-
ination's outcome.37 Once appeal proceedings have terminated, the
final outcome of the reexamination is reported and published in a reex-
amination certificate issued by the Commissioner.
38
Where reexamination is sought by the patent owner, the denial of
his request due to the absence of a "substantial new question of patent-
ability" will hardly be troubling. The denial signifies that the newly
cited prior art has been found by the Office to raise no substantial ques-
tion on the patentability of his patent.39 If a reexamination is under-
taken, the owner is permitted to file a statement in support of his
patent, 4° interact with the examiner,4 ' and seek review of the exam-
tion in the reexamination. If the patent owner files such a statement, he promptly will
serve a copy of it on the person who has requested reexamination under the provisions of
section 302 of this title. Within a period of two months from the date of service, that
person may file and have considered in the reexamination a reply to any statement filed
by the patent owner. That person promptly will serve on the patent owner a copy of any
reply filed.
See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.525, .530, .535 (1981).
36. 35 U.S.C.A. § 305 (West Sp. Supp. 1980) provides in part that "Reexamination will be
conducted according to the procedures established for initial examination .. " See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 132, 133 (1976). The two procedures differ in that amending the claims of a patent to enlarge
their scope is permitted in an initial examination, but prohibited in a reexamination. 35 U.S.C.A.
§ 305 (West Sp. Supp. 1980). See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.552 (1981).
37. 35 U.S.C.A. § 306 (West Sp. Supp. 1980) provides:
The patent owner involved in a reexamination proceeding under this chapter may
appeal under the provisions of section 134 of this title, and may seek court review under
the provisions of sections 141 to 145 of this title, with respect to any decisions adverse to
the patentability of any original or proposed amended or new claim of the patent.
Section 134 authorizes an appeal to the Office's Board of Appeals. See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1976).
38. 35 U.S.C.A. § 307(a) (West Sp. Supp. 1980) provides:
In a reexamination proceeding under this chapter, when the time for appeal has
expired or any appeal proceeding has terminated, the Commissioner will issue and pub-
lish a certificate canceling any claim of the patent finally determined to be unpatentable,
confirming any claim of the patent determined to be patentable, and incorporating in the
patent any proposed amended or new claim determined to be patentable.
See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.570 (1981).
39. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (West Sp. Supp. 1980). The pertinent text of section 303(a)
appears in note 33 supra.
40. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 304 (West Sp. Supp. 1980). The text of section 304 appears in note 35
supra.
41. 35 U.S.C.A. § 305 (West Sp. Supp. 1980) provides in part that "reexamination will be
conducted according to the procedures established for initial examination under the provisions of
Sections 132 and 133 of this title." See 35 U.S.C. §§ 132, 133 (1976). The interaction between the
patent owner and the examiner is governed by the same rules that govern the interaction between
an applicant for a patent and the examiner. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111-.139 (1981).
REEXAMINATION
iner's decision.42
In contrast, the participation of a third party requester is quite lim-
ited by the statute and rules. If the reexamination request is denied, the
denial is final and unappealable.4 3 If a reexamination is undertaken,
the input of a third party requester is limited to the information con-
tained in his request unless the patent owner files a statement support-
ing his patent to which the requester can reply.4" The requester may
not interact with the examiner during the reexamination 45 and he may
not seek review of the examiner's decision.4 6
As will be shown, both the limited role accorded to a third party
requester 47 and the fact that only the newly cited prior art need be con-
sidered in a reexamination48 undermine the finality of the outcome of a
reexamination and, hence, the efficacy of the procedure.
EFFECT OF A REEXAMINATION ON SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION:
LESSONS FROM THE CONTESTED REISSUE PROCEDURE
Any statement as to the effect on patent validity of either surviving
a reexamination or of a denial of a request for lack of a finding of the
presence of a substantial new question of patentability is glaringly ab-
sent from the reexamination statute. Also, no reference relating the
outcome of a reexamination to the statutory presumption of validity is
present.49 Thus, the statute is silent on what effect, if any, the outcome
42. 35 U.S.C.A. § 306 (West Sp. Supp. 1980). See note 37 supra for the text of section 306.
43. 35 U.S.C.A. § 303(c) (West Sp. Supp. 1980). See note 34 supra.
44. 35 U.S.C.A. § 304 (West Sp. Supp. 1980). See note 35 supra.
45. 35 U.S.C.A. § 305 (West Sp. Supp. 1980). See note 36 supra. See also comments of
Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Tegtmeyer, 1007 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 30,
31, 34 (1981). The Rules of Practice do, however, provide that reexamination files are open to the
public. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 1(c), (d) (1981). The third party requester will also be sent copies of Office
actions by the Office, and papers filed by the patent owner must be served on the requester, after
his active participation ends. 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(e) (1981).
46. 35 U.S.C.A. § 306 (West Sp. Supp. 1980). See note 37 supra.
47. In view of this "hamstringing" of a third party requester, it may seem difficult to conjure
up a situation in which an individual or corporation with previously uncited art would request a
reexamination. However, various business purposes, including contingent licenses reached with
patent owners which require reexamination of the licensed patent as part of the agreement, as well
as instances where the dollar value of the product cannot justify the cost of litigation, yet infringe-
ment problems exist or are believed to exist, may well provide the impetus for third party requests.
48. 35 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (West Sp. Supp. 1980). See note 33 supra.
49. The lack of such a reference, in view of the legislative history and the reference to other
sections of title 35, e.g., in section 305, is puzzling in the least. If the intent of Congress was truly
to strengthen issued patents and settle questions of validity by examination over previously un-
cited art, failure to explicitly provide for such a strengthening by statutory provision or, at mini-
mum, to explicitly refer to the preexisting statutory presumption, constitutes a missed opportunity
to make a clear statement to patentees, patent owners, potential infringers and the courts of the
effect of reexamination. Although it is certainly arguable that the presumption automatically ap-
plies where a request to reexamine is granted and the patent is in fact reexamined over the newly
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of a reexamination will have on subsequent litigation in which the va-
lidity of the patent is challenged.
At this early juncture, no court has been faced with either infringe-
ment or declaratory judgment litigation involving a reexamined patent.
However, the judicial reaction to the outcome of a reexamination may
be predicted by reviewing the effect on subsequent litigation that courts
have accorded to a similar Office procedure: the recently instituted
"contested" reissue proceeding.50 Courts have utilized three different
approaches in determining the effect of a contested reissue proceeding
on subsequent litigation. These approaches consist of resjudicata, col-
lateral estoppel and the statutory presumption of patent validity. These
approaches are examined here to determine the extent of their applica-
bility to the reexamination procedure.
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
The doctrine of resjudicata gives conclusive effect to a cause of
action that has been reduced to judgment. Once a judgment on the
merits has been obtained, the doctrine operates as an absolute bar to
the relitigation of the same cause of action between the same parties or
those in privity with them. 51 In contrast, the doctrine of collateral es-
cited art and found allowable, this assumption does not hold where the request for reexamination
is denied for lack of a "substantial new question of patentability." In that circumstance, there will
be no examination in the sense of 35 U.S.C. §§ 132, 133 (1976), which has long been the prerequi-
site for applicability of 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976) to a reference. See text accompanying notes 92-108
infra.
Fueling this confusion are other statements in the House Report as to the "major thrusts" of
the bill. The Report states that "First, [the bill] . . . strengthens investor confidence in the cer-
tainty of patent rights by creating a system of administrative reexamination of doubtful patents."
House Report, supra note 26, at 3. This echoes other language in the Report about "assuring the
kind of certainty about patent validity which is a necessary ingredient of sound investment deci-
sions." Id.
More telling, however, is the comment in the section-by-section analysis of the Report with
respect to section 303:
No one would be deprived of any legal right by a denial by the Commissioner of a
request for reexamination. A party to a reexamination proceeding could still argue in
any subsequent litigation that the PTO erred and that the patent is invalid on the basis of
the cited prior art.
House Report, supra note 26, at 7. Given the courts' reluctance, in view of the presumption of
validity, to find a patent invalid where the trial record contains nothing more than the art of
record before the Office, one of two conclusions can be drawn from this latter statement in the
Report: it is either devoid of meaning, or it represents a departure from existing precedents con-
cerning the presumption of validity in situations where no "substantial new question of patenta-
bility" is found to exist: that no presumption attaches on such a denial.
50. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
51. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948). See generally IB MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 1 0.405111 (1980).
Technically, the doctrines of resjudicata and collateral estoppel differ in scope. Resjudicaza
imparts conclusive effect to an adjudicated cause of action, while collateral estoppel accords final-
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toppel accords final effect to the adjudication of particular issues. The
doctrine bars the relitigation of specific issues of fact or law that have
been fully litigated in a prior proceeding between the parties.
52
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is also applied to bar the reliti-
gation of issues that have been litigated and adjudicated in a prior ad-
ministrative proceeding. 53 This application of collateral estoppel is
based on judicial deference to an agency's designated adjudicative role
in its particular area of expertise. 54 Consonant with the requirement of
prior litigation and adjudication, the United States Supreme Court has
stated that factual issues resolved in administrative proceedings will be
given collateral estoppel effect if the proceedings afford a party "a fair
opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially to pursue his
claim."- 5
In Pic, Inc. v. Prescon Corp. ,56 the district court granted a stay in a
ity to particular adjudicated issues. Unfortunately, this distinction is often blurred by the use of
the term resjudicata broadly to refer to the conclusive effect of either doctrine. See I B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.44[2] (1980). Such a broad use of the term resyudicata is not intended
here.
52. See, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955). See generally IB
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.44112) (1980).
Traditionally, only a party that had participated in the prior proceeding or a party in privity
with the participating party was permitted to raise the bar of resjudicata or collateral estoppel.
See, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955); Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912). See generally IB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE $ 0.41211] (1980). This requirement of mutuality has been recently eroded by the Supreme
Court to permit a party not bound by an earlier proceeding to raise the collateral estoppel bar. In
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), the
Court permitted the defendant to a patent infringement action to plead collateral estoppel, where
the patent had been found invalid in a prior litigation against another defendant. In Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the Court permitted a plaintiff in a securities law action
to raise collateral estoppel against the defendant corporation, where the corporation had been
found to have violated the securities law in a prior litigation brought by a different plaintiff, the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The offensive and defensive use of collateral estoppel by
parties that are not bound by the earlier proceeding has been the subject of much commentary.
See Axinn, Developments and Issues In Collateral Estoppel, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Federal
Civil Practice & Litigation (1981); Callen, To Bury Mutuality, Not To Praise It: An Analysis of
Collateral Estoppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HASTINGS L. J. 755 (1980); Smith, The
Collateral Estoppel Effect ofa Prior Judgment of Patent Invalidity Blonder- Tongue Revisited (pts.
1-3), 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 285, 363, 436 (1973); Comment, The Offensive Use ofNon-mutual
Collateral Estoppel and The Seventh Amendment, 9 STETSON L. REV. 182 (1979); Note, Mutuality
ofEstoppel and the Seventh Amendment. The Effect ofParklane Hosiery, 64 CORNELL L. REV.
1001 (1979). See also 4 CHISUM, supra note 9, §§ 19.02[2][a]-[fl. See generally Note, The Collat-
eral Estoppel Effect of4dministrative 4gency ,4ctions In Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 65 (1977); Note, The Impacts ofDefensive And Offensive Assertion oCollateral Estoppel By4
Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Nasem v. Brown, 595
F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
54. United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421 n.18, 421-22 (1966).
55. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of I11. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971).
See also United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966).
56. 485 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Del. 1980).
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patent infringement action due to the ongoing contested reissue pro-
ceeding of the patent in suit. Subsequently, the Office upheld the valid-
ity of the patent over the prior art cited to it during the reissue
proceeding. 57 The patent owner then moved for partial summary judg-
ment on the issue of his patent's validity over the cited prior art on the
ground that the Office reissue decision should be accorded either res
judicata or collateral estoppel effect.
58
In denying the patent owner's motion, the court first observed that
patent validity was at issue in the reissue proceeding while the litigation
before it involved both patent infringement and validity. Although it
recognized the existence of "some connection" between the reissue pro-
ceeding and the litigation, the court concluded that the two did not
amount to the same cause of action and thus found res judicata
inapplicable.
59
The court also found collateral estoppel inapplicable because the
contested reissue proceeding did not provide an adequate opportunity
to the third party protester to litigate his claim. It noted the protester's
lack of an opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses or to
engage in discovery. It also noted the differences between the applicant
and the protester with regard to the right to request oral argument
before the Office Board of Appeals, the right to meet and discuss the
application with the examiner, and the right to appeal adverse
decisions.
60
In applying Pic, Inc. v. Prescon Corp. to the reexamination proce-
57. Id. at 1303.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1308.
60. Id at 1311.
In dicta, the court stated that if the reissue procedure were to afford protesters an adequate
opportunity to litigate their claims, a patent owner could raise collateral estoppel on the issue of
patent validity against a protester or other party in subsequent litigation:
In so holding, the Court has analyzed the opportunity for Prescon to participate in
the Lang application proceeding, and not the extent of Prescon's actual participation.
Prescon has expressly stated that its failure to file a protest prior to late 1978 was based,
in large part, upon its concern that "any participation on its part at this point in time
might serve to create a resjudicata situation... " fthe Court had/ound that the PTO
proceedings satiofed the. . . [adequate opportunity] requirements Prescon could not have
defended against the application of collateral estoppel merely by not participating in the
proceedings.
Id. at 1311 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). For a discussion of the applicability of collateral
estoppel to a party not bound by the prior proceeding, see note 52 supra.
If the Pic court is correct in its view of the effect of an "adequate opportunity" reissue pro-
ceeding on a nonparticipant, a reissue would be of great value to a patent owner. The owner need
only successfully reissue the patent to be able to raise offensive collateral estoppel as to the validity
of his patent over the newly cited prior art. See Lieberman, In Rem Validity--A Two-Sided Coin,
53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 9 (1971). The notice requirement for the in rem nature of the proceeding
would seemingly be satisfied by publication of notice of the reissue application in the Official
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dure, it is apparent that the role of a contested reissue protester and
that of a third party reexamination requester are similarly limited.
Such limitations prevent both procedures from affording a party a full
and fair opportunity to litigate an issue. Accordingly, the outcome of
neither proceeding can be accorded any finality in subsequent litigation
under a collateral estoppel theory. Because administrative proceedings
will generally not amount to the same cause of action that is subse-
quently litigated, the doctrine of resjudicata will not accord such pro-
ceedings any finality. Thus, it appears that the outcome of a
reexamination procedure cannot obtain any conclusive effect under ei-
ther a resjudicata or collateral estoppel theory.
61
There is one exception to this conclusion. Congress has provided
Gazette, as provided by 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(b) (1981). See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE, §§ 12.1,
12.7, 12.11 (1965).
The current weight of precedent, however, still seems to lie squarely against affording estop-
pel effect with respect to validity insofar as a noninvolved, later litigant is concerned. The Court
in Blonder-Tongue, in dicta, stated:
Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may not be collater-
ally estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a chance to present their
evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one
or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their
position. . . . But the case before us involves neither due process nor "offensive use"
questions.
402 U.S. at 329-30 (footnote omitted). Accord, United States Indus., Inc. v. Norton Co., 195
U.S.P.Q. 303, 307 (N.D. N.Y. 1977) ("On the other hand, there is no mutual use for collateral
estoppel purposes of a finding of validity in the patentee's favor .... "); 4 CHIsuM, supra note 9,
§ 19.02[21[e]. See also Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 209 U.S.P.Q. 1030 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (refusal
to give collateral estoppel effect to patentee's admission of patent invalidity forming basis for
United States International Trade Commission finding); Blumcraft v. Architectural Art Mfg., Inc.,
337 F. Supp. 853, 858 (D. Kan. 1972), aff'd, 459 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1972); Phillips Elec. & Phar-
maceutical Inds. Corp. v. Thermal & Elec. Inds., Inc., 450 F.2d 1164, 1175-76 (3d Cir. 1971);
Boutell v. Volk, 449 F.2d 673, 678 (10th Cir. 1971); lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 0.41 111
(1980).
Cf. Union Carbide Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. 62, 64 (S.D. N.Y. 1971) (im-
plies that a level of involvement less than direct participation in a suit may give rise to collateral
estoppel) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-55 (1979)); Shimman v. Frank, 625
F.2d 80, 89-90 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1003 (9th Cir.
1980) ("Courts have recognized that a non-party may be bound if a party is so closely aligned with
its interests as to be its 'virtual representative' "). See also Plastic Container Corp; v. Continental
Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 893-95 (10th Cir. 1979); Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th
Cir. 1978) (noting the continuing rapid extension of the resjudicata and collateral estoppel doc-
trines with respect to "decisions of administrative agencies in appropriate cases"); Zdanok v. Glid-
den Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
61. The Pic court's decision was indicated to have been a motivating factor in the Office's
proposal of new protester participation rules. Remarks by R. Franklin Burnett, Proposed
Rulemaking Seminar, Reexamination & Inter Partes Protest Expansion, Washington, D.C. (March
3, 1981). The rules as proposed by the Patent and Trademark Office, also contained expanded
procedures for the contested reissue procedure, so as to provide for more interpartes participation.
Proposed Rules §§ 1.56(e), 1.360-.380 at 46 Fed. Reg. 3164 (1981). After substantial negative com-
ment on causing expansion of interpartes protests at the same time as commencement of reexami-
nation, see 527 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. A-4 (1981); 1007 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 30, 31
(1981), the proposed rules were withdrawn.
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the Patent Office with power to cancel individual claims or an entire
patent in the course of a reexamination, 62 but it has not done so for
contested reissue proceedings. Although such action by the Office is
appealable, 63 once upheld it is binding on all subsequent litigation.
Presumption of Validity
The statutory presumption of validity attaches to each duly issued
patent and extends to each one of the patent's claims. 64 This presump-
tion is based upon the acknowledged expertise of the Office and the
recognition that patent approval is an administrative determination
supported by evidence. 65 Courts have differed on what effect, if any, a
contested reissue proceeding in which a patent has been reissued has on
the presumption of validity that originally attached to that patent.
Corometrics Medical Systems v. Berkeley Bio-Engineering, Inc. 66
was decided before the Office Rules were amended to permit a con-
tested reissue proceeding. There, Berkeley and Hewlett-Packard filed
protests to a reissue application by the Corometrics inventors. In an
unusual departure from normal procedure, the Assistant Commissioner
for Patents suspended the reissue proceeding and gave the protesters
the opportunity to argue for rejection of the application as unpatent-
able. The examiner allowed the claims over their arguments and a nar-
rowed patent issued.
67
When sued for infringement on the reissued patent, Berkeley
raised the same grounds as a defense of invalidity that it had unsuccess-
fully argued before the Office. 68 In finding the patent valid and in-
fringed, the court noted that the patent's presumption of validity had
62. 35 U.S.C.A. § 307(a) (West Sp. Supp. 1980).
63. 35 U.S.C.A. § 306 (West Sp. Supp. 1980).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976) provides in part:
A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, de-
endent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the va-
idty of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid
even though dependent upon an invalid claim. The burden of establishing invalidity of
a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.
65. E.g., Lee-Boy Mfg. Co. v. Puckett, 202 U.S.P.Q. 573, 574 (N.D. Ga. 1978). See generally
2 ROBINSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, § 426 (1890); C. RIVISE & A. CAESAR, PAT-
ENTABILITY AND VALIDITY, § 6 (1936); 4 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS, § 261
(1965 & Supp. 1971); 2 CHISUM, supra note 9, § 5.06[2].
66. 193 U.S.P.Q. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
67. Id. at 472. See also In re Bonn, 193 U.S.P.Q. 190 (Comm'r Pats. 1976). There, a patent
was involved in litigation and a petition by the non-owner party for access to the reissue applica-
tion was granted. The Office allowed the non-owner party to file a written submission based on
the pending suit, but denied a request for other rights, including the right to interview the exam-
iner or otherwise have an oral hearing in the case.
68. 193 U.S.P.Q. at 472.
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been strengthened by the extraordinary interpartes reissue proceeding
in which all of the contentions raised by the defendant were rejected by
the Office.
69
Various commentators subsequently suggested that this enhanced
presumption approach would also be applicable to formal contested re-
issue proceedings. 70 Although two decisions after Corometrics tangen-
tially supported its enhanced-presumption-of-validity approach, 7' only
69. Id. at 470.
Historical support for a "strengthening" or "'enhancement" of the presumption of validity
based on the exparte reexamination provided by 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-307 (West Sp. Supp. 1980) is
found in the extension proceedings provided by statute prior to 1861. In describing the issues
which had to be addressed during such a proceeding; Robinson stated:
The extension of an invalid patent is manifestly unjust and improper, whether the
invalidity is due to the nature of its subject-matter or to incurable defects in the instru-
ment itself. Upon an application for a prolongation of the monopoly this entire question
may be examined, and if it is apparent that the patent ought not to have been originally
granted it will not be renewed ....
In determining this question, however, the presumption is in favor of the validity of
the original patent . . . .An extension in the face of opposition strengthens this pre-
sumption, and in its turn may be urged in favor of the patent in the courts.
3 W. ROBINSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS § 839 (1890) (footnotes omitted).
In Whitney v. Mowry, 29 F. Cas. 1095 (No. 17,592) (C.C. S.D. Ohio 1867), a suit in equity
was brought to restrain infringement of a patent which had been extended by the Office. Al-
though the reported decision is unclear, it appears that the extension was exparte, with no opposi-
tion from another party. 29 F. Cas. at 1096. In addressing the effect of successful extension, the
court stated:
A patent which successfully undergoes this scrutiny, without any modification of the
original claim and specification, has very strong presumptive claims to validity, as being
both new and useful.
Id. at 1097.
In Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co., 108 F. 845 (4th Cir. 1901), the court
commented favorably on the strengthened-presumption-of-validity approach:
Thereupon, followed some correspondence and interviews with the patent attorneys
in Washington on the subject, and Painter filed his application for reissue December 26,
1895. . . .Keizer and Hall filed a protest against a reissue, and during two years the
whole question was thoroughly discussed before the examiners and board of appeals in
the patent office. An effort was made to defeat the original claims as well as that intro-
duced by reissue. The learned counsel for the defendants, who testified as an expert in
the case, bears testimony as to the great experience and competency of these officials; and
while we do not go sofar as to hold that their decision upon this point is conclusive, as some
of the courts are manifestly inclined to do, we are of opinion that the decision of compe-
tent experts, made after a full hearing, where both sides had been represented by able
counseland not impeached by fraud or favoritism, has great persuasive force.
Id at 859 (emphasis added).
70. See D. DUNNER, J. GAMBRELL & I. KAYTON, PAT. L. PERSP. § A.8[l] (1977 Dev.);
Bjorge, 35 USC 103; The PTO, The Courts and the Future, 5 AM. PAT L.A.Q. BULL. 137, 142-43
(1977); Dunner & Lipsey, The New Reissue Practice, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 68, 93-94 (1979);
Rathbun, The New Inter Partes Practice, 5 AM. PAT. L.A.Q. BULL. 224, 237-38 (1977); WALTER-
SCHEID & CAGE, Jurisdiction of The Patent and Trademark Office To Consider The Validity of
Issues Patents, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 444, 453-56 (1979).
71. In Choat v. Rome Indus., Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. 549 (N.D. Ga. 1979), the court compelled the
owner of the patent in suit to submit to a contested reissue proceeding. In commenting on the
effect of the proceeding on the patent's validity, the court stated:
Further, patents are entitled to a statutory presumption of validity. . . .This pre-
sumption is premised upon the acknowledged expertise of the Patent Office and the rec-
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recently have courts squarely addressed the effect of a contested reissue
proceeding on the presumption of patent validity.
In National Tractor Pullers Association, Inc. v. Watkins,72 Watkins,
the patent owner, was defending an action seeking a declaratory j udg-
ment of patent invalidity and noninfringement. He filed a reissue ap-
plication under the new contested procedure and the court stayed
proceedings. The plaintiff, National Tractor Pullers, was advised of the
filing of the reissue application and filed a protest. There followed a
long contested proceeding during which issues of patentability and
fraud were raised before the Office. Watkins' patent was eventually
upheld and reissued.
73
At trial, National Tractor Pullers raised substantially the same al-
legations against the validity of the patent that it had raised in the reis-
sue proceeding. It offered no new evidence of prior art. 74 Additionally,
ognition that patent approval is a species of administrative determination supported by
evidence . ... A referral to the Patent Office of samples of the prior art not previously
considered by it is consistent with the directives of the statutes and the case law ....
Should plaintiffs patent-in-suit be denied reissue on the ground that no change in the
claims of the patent is necessary by reason of the prior art raised, plaintiff will enjoy a
strengthened presumption of validity.
Although this Court is not bound by a decision rendered by the Patent Office regarding
reissue ofplainti's patent-in-suit, directing reissue could in effect determine the question of
validity subject to review by this Court, and end this litigation by making moot all other
issues ...
Id. at 552 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
In Kelley Mfg. Co. v. Lilliston Corp., 200 U.S.P.Q. 670 (E.D. N.C. 1978), the patent owner
had submitted his patent to a reissue proceeding before the Office rules were changed to permit it
to be contested. Nevertheless, the other party to the litigation was given the opportunity to pro-
vide some input to the examiner but did not do so. The patent was reissued. At trial, the other
party charged the patent owner with fraud and misconduct in the course of the reissue proceeding.
The court prohibited the other party from going forward with those charges, stating:
Kelley had knowledge of the Lehman reissue application. Defendant agreed to al-
low Kelley access to the application file and proceedings during prosecution; and, in fact,
defendant furnished Kelley with copies of all documents submitted to and received from
the Patent Office. Although Kelley had the opportunity, it chose not to participate and did
not submit any prior art references or attempt to explain defendant's "interpretation of
the claims." It cannot now be heard to complain that defendant brought over 270 items of
prior art to the prosecution of the '271 reissue or that defendant didn't explain its "claim
interpretation. " . .
Plaintiff's allegation that the date on which the supposed defect in the '387 patent
was discovered was misrepresented to the Patent Office is not supported by the record
... . There is no showing of any intentional misrepresentation, bad faith, gross negli-
gence or reckless disregard of counsel's duty. Kelley remained silent throughout the reissue
proceedings and now cannot be heard to complain.
200 U.S.P.Q. at 692-93 (emphasis added). See also D. DUNNER, J. GAMBRELL & I. KAYTON, PAT.
L. PERSP. § A.8[l] (1979 Dev.). The correctness of this decision is questionable, given that the
concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel require that a proceeding comply with a high
standard of adversariness before its outcome will be accorded binding effect. See text accompany-
ing notes 51-56 supra.
72. 205 U.S.P.Q. 892 (N.D. I11. 1980).
73. Id. at 901-04.
74. Id. at 904.
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the Association raised the same defense to Watkins' counterclaim for
infringement that it had raised with the Office. 75 Stating that it would
uphold the Office's decision in a contested reissue proceeding absent a
"thorough conviction supported by clear and convincing evidence that
the decision was erroneous," the court held that the Watkins' patent
was valid and that it had been infringed.
76
In announcing its "thorough conviction" test, the court relied di-
rectly on Morgan v. Daniels.77 There, the issue of priority of invention
had arisen between two patent applicants. In establishing the effect of
the Office's determination on subsequent litigation, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Office's decision was to be controlling un-
less contrary evidence carried a "thorough conviction. 7 Although the
Morgan rule was couched in terms of questions of fact,7 9 the National
Tractor Pullers court expanded its scope to include patent validity de-
terminations in contested reissue proceedings.
In effect, the National Tractor Pullers court held that a successful
contested reissue proceeding greatly strengthens the presumption of va-
lidity that attaches to an issued patent.80 Although the direct applica-
tion of Morgan v. Daniels may be questionable,"' the court's approach
in requiring a higher standard of proof was innovative even though it
75. Id. at 910.
76. Id. at 911.
77. 153 U.S. 120 (1894).
78. Id. at 125. The Court stated:
[I]t must be laid down as a rule that where the question decided in the Patent Office is
one between contesting parties as to priority of invention, the decision there must be
accepted as controlling upon that question of fact in any subsequent suit between the
same parties, unless the contrary is established by testimony which in character and
amount carries thorough conviction.
Id.
79. The Court characterized the litigation that followed the Office's determination of inven-
tion priority as "a controversy between two individuals over a question of fact which has once
been settled by a special tribunal, entrusted with full power in the premises." Id. at 124. See also
note 79 supra.
80. 205 U.S.P.Q. at 910-11.
81. In addition to the issue that the rule of Morgan is limited to questions of fact, significant
differences exist between the interference proceeding considered in Morgan and a contested reis-
sue proceeding. In an interference proceeding, both parties may file briefs, file motions, partici-
pate in a hearing and seek review of the Office's decision. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.201-.287 (1980). In
contrast, the role of a protester in a contested reissue proceeding is quite limited. See text accom-
panying notes 43-46 supra.
The National Tractor Pullers Ass'n holding is also suspect in view of its conflict with Chicago
Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. Crane Packing Co., 523 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1975). There, Mr. Justice Stevens,
then Circuit Judge Stevens, writing for the court, stated that:
There are two aspects to the presumption of validity. First, as a matter of proce-
dure, § 282 places the burden of persuasion on the party attacking the validity of the
patent. This burden remains upon the alleged infringer throughout the proceeding and
is in no sense dependent on the character of the proceedings before the Patent Office or
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echoed the rationale of Corometrics Medical Systems v. Berkeley Bio-
Engineering, Inc. 8 2 By utilizing this approach, the court was able to
accord considerable weight to the outcome of a reissue proceeding
without having to meet the requirements of resjiudicata or collateral
estoppel. Pic, Inc. v. Prescon Corp. 83 had shown that it was not possible
for the contested reissue proceeding in its present form to meet these
requirements. 84
Decisions subsequent to National Tractor Pullers have rejected its
approach of finding a strengthened presumption of validity for a reis-
sued patent by requiring a high level of proof. In Bally Manufacturing
Corp. v. Parker,"5 Bally sought a restraining order instructing the Office
to terminate examination of Bally's reissue application. Newly uncov-
ered unpublished prior art was submitted by the reissue protestors and
Bally wanted the reissue proceeding suspended until the Office promul-
gated rules with respect to the treatment of such protester-supplied
prior art. The district court denied the petition for the injunction on
the ground that Bally had failed to await final Office action and to ex-
haust administrative appeals before suing in federal court.86 In dicta,
the court added that Bally had failed to show irreparable harm because
the outcome of the reissue proceeding was not binding on the pending
litigation. The court noted that the weight to be accorded the outcome
of the reissue proceeding depended solely on the trial court's
discretion.
8 7
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal
the amount of prior art cited to, or considered by, the Patent Examiner. In its first as-
pect, the presumption is constant.
There is an additional aspect to the presumption which relates to the deference due
to the technical expertise possessed by the Patent Office and not generally possessed by
federal judges. Notwithstanding the ex parte character of the normal Patent Office pros-
ecution, if it appears that the prior art which is cited to establish invalidity in a judicial
proceeding had already been considered by the Patent Office, the burden of overcoming
the presumption of validity then rests heavily on the person attacking the patent. He
must make a "clear and cogent" showing in order to prevail.
The presumption, however, never becomes so strong that a patent is completely
unassailable. A demonstration that the art considered by the Patent Office is the same as
the art considered by the court strengthens the presumption in the sense that it provides the
Justjcation for the requirement that invalidity be established by clear and convincing evi-
dence, but such a demonstration is not also a bootstrap that lfts the presumption to a still
higher level.
Id. at 458 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
82. 193 U.S.P.Q. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1977). For a discussion of the case, see text accompanying
notes 66-69 supra.
83. 485 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Del. 1980).
84. See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
85. 207 U.S.P.Q. 117 (E.D. Va. 1979), aft'd, 629 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1980).
86. Id. at 118-19.
87. Id. at 119.
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to grant the injunction on ripeness grounds. The court also confirmed
in dicta that the outcome of the reissue proceeding would not be bind-
ing on the pending litigation.88 In so doing, the court characterized the
outcome of a reissue proceeding as in the nature of an advisory opin-
ion, possibly entitled to great weight in subsequent litigation.8 9 In two
other decisions, courts have also spoken unfavorably of an enhanced
presumption of validity for a reissued patent. 90
It may be seen, therefore, that the case law on the effect of a con-
tested reissue proceeding on the presumption of validity in subsequent
litigation is in turmoil. National Tractor Pullers found that the pre-
88. 629 F.2d at 960 n.7 ("The Illinois district court may find the decision of the examiner
helpful, but it will not be bound thereby.") (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 957-58. The court characterized the reissue procedure as permitting "a patentee to
use the reissue process to obtain an advisory opinion as to the validity of his patent." Id. The
court also noted:
Since reissue applications can be granted only where the original patent is wholly or
partly inoperative or invalid, 35 U.S.C. § 251, filing a reissue application subjects the
original patent to the patent examiner's expert determination of validity in light of the
new prior art. A reissue rejection, whether based on the finding of the examiner that the
original patent is entirely valid or on his finding that the reissue claims do not describe a
patentable invention, is purely advisory. The examiner's expert opinion may carry sub-
stantial weight in an infringement action involving the same patent and prior art.
Id. at 958 (footnote omitted).
A similar opinion as to the advisory nature of the outcome of a reissue proceeding on subse-
quent litigation was expressed by the court in Pic, Inc. v. Prescon Corp., 485 F. Supp. 1302 (D.
Del. 1980):
However, while the PTO has consistently emphasized the goals of prompt examina-
tion of reissue applications and improved quality and reliability of issued patents in
connection with the new regulations, it has never suggested an intention to replace the
courts in determining issues ofpatent validity. Indeed, in connection with a proposal to
provide a procedure whereby any member of the public could bring prior art patents and
publications to the attention of the PTO and have the PTO rule on the validity of an
issued patent in view of this information, the PTO has expressly stated, "'[clourts would
not be bound by advisory opinions. The ultimate decision as to validiy would, under ex-
isting law, remain with the court. Under the proposal, however, the court would have an
opportunity to consider the Office's opinion on prior art that the court otherwise would
be called upon to evaluate in the first instance."
Id. at 1311 (emphasis added, citations omitted). The Pic court also noted that the protester's
participation in the contested reissue proceeding had created no enhancement of the burden of
proof on the infringement defendant and that no "clearly erroneous" standard was to be applied
to the Office's decision. Id. at 1313.
90. In Mooney v. Brunswick Corp., 489 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Wis. 1980), the patent in suit was
reissued and plaintiff maintained that the presumption of validity should be enhanced. In refus-
ing to accept plaintiff's enhancement plea, the court stated:
To determine whether the presumption of validity should be strengthened, the
Court need not reach the validity of defendant's arguments because, from its under-
standing of the law in the Seventh Circuit, the statutory presumption can never be en-
hanced. The factors raised by the plaintiff and defendant alike are relevant only in the
determination of whether the presumption as set by statute is dissipated to any extent.
Id. at 554.
Seealso Unidisco, Inc. v. Schattner, 210 U.S.P.Q. 622 (D. Md. 1981), where the court refused
to stay a declaratory judgment suit pending completion of a reissue proceeding, in large part due
to the unsatisfactory level of protester participation possible and to the lack of a "clearly errone-
ous" level of deference attaching to any Office findings relating to validity.
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sumption of validity was strengthened for a reissued patent, requiring a
higher standard of proof. Bally noted that any strengthening of the
presumption was discretionary with the trial court. Other courts have
split on whether any strengthening of the presumption occurs.9 1
Given that some courts have described the effect of a contested
reissue proceeding on subsequent litigation in terms of a strengthening
of the patent's presumption of validity, this suggests that such an ap-
proach might also be utilized to describe the effect of a reexamination
on subsequent litigation. An analysis of the circumstances under which
the presumption of validity arises thus becomes necessary to determine
whether the reexamination procedure can give rise to the presumption.
This analysis could also serve to avoid the type of judicial confusion
with respect to the presumption of validity that presently exists for con-
tested reissue proceedings.
REEXAMINATION AND THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY
The presumption of validity arises most strongly where the perti-
nent prior art has been actively considered by the Office.92 Such con-
sideration is generally given in the course of a contested interference
proceeding. 93 Although the presumption of validity arises over perti-
91. Compare Choat v. Rome Indus., Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. 549 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Kelley Mfg. Co.
v. Lilliston Corp., 200 U.S.P.Q. 670 (E.D. N.C. 1978) (presumption of validity enhanced), with
Mooney v. Brunswick Corp., 489 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (presumption not enhanced). For
a discusion of these cases, see notes 71 & 90 supra.
92. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Amerola Products Corp., 552 F.2d 1020, 1024 (3rd
Cir. 1977); Scaramucci v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 427 F.2d 1309, 1313 (10th Cir. 1970); TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 406 F.2d 53, 57 (7th Cir. 1968).
The presumption of validity is also strengthened when the prior art relied on to show patent
invalidity in subsequent litigation was considered by the Office. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v.
American Hospital Supply Corp., 534 F.2d 89, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1976); Marston v. J. C. Penney Co.,
353 F.2d 976, 982 (4th Cir. 1965); Neff Instrument Corp. v. Cohn Electronics, Inc., 298 F.2d 82,
86-87 (9th Cir. 1961); Admiral Radio Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 296 F.2d 708, 712 (10th Cir.
1961).
The strength of the presumption varies, of course, with the substance of the assertion by the
patentee or alleged infringer. See Tee-Pak, Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 491 F.2d 1193, 1196 (6th
Cir. 1974); Bowser, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 346, 349 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
93. See, e.g., RCA v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 3-5, 7 (1934) ("A
patent regularly issued, and even more obviously a patent issued after a hearing of all rival claim-
ants, is presumed to be valid until the presumption has been overcome by convincing evidence of
error."); Hildreth v. Mastoras, 257 U.S. 27, 32 (1921) ("The presumption of priority and novelty
which arises from the granting of a patent must have greatly increased weight when the claim of
the inventor is subjected to such close and heated scrutiny under the stimulus of a heated con-
test."); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 430 F.2d 221, 222, 225 (6th Cir. 1970);
Blaw-Knox Co. v. Hartsville Oil Mill, 394 F.2d 877, 880 (4th Cir. 1968); Huck Mfg. Co. v. Tex-
tron, Inc., 187 U.S.P.Q. 388, 395-96, 407 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Columbia Broadcasting System v.
Sylvania Products, 294 F. Supp. 468, 479 (D. Mass. 1968).
However, mere involvement in an interference is not in and of itself sufficient to strengthen
the presumption; the actual nature of the specific interference activities and adjudications must be
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nent prior art that has been brought to the attention of the Office, the
presumption is weakened if the art is not discussed or cited in the Of-
fice's decision.94 The presumption does not arise over prior art not
brought to the Office's attention.95
The reexamination procedure attempts to preserve the presump-
tion of validity by permitting the Office to consider pertinent prior art
that has been uncovered after the patent has issued. In this manner, the
newly uncovered reference is deprived of its otherwise debilitating ef-
fect on the presumption of validity in litigation.96 However, the re-
quirement of due consideration by the Office must be met before the
presumption of validity arises over the newly uncovered prior art. To
the extent that the present reexamination procedure fails to compel
such due consideration, it inhibits the presumption of validity from
arising and thus deprives the reexamination procedure of having any
conclusive effect on subsequent litigation.
Reexamination On Finding A Substantial New
Question of Patentability
The mere disclosure of a reference to the Office, together with its
considered, and must constitute the proper Office review of the art at issue to result in an enhance-
ment of the presumption. See Forbro Design Corp. v. Raytheon Co., 532 F.2d 758, 761-62 (1st
Cir. 1976) (insufficient showing of Graham patentability analysis; no indicia of Patent Office study
of the specific litigated issues); Himmel Bros. Co. v. Serrick Corp., 122 F.2d 740, 745-46 (7th Cir.
1941) (no enhancement where party to the interference conceded priority, and no final hearing
occurred); Mohasco Industries, Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Mills, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 191, 202 (D. Ga.
1963). See also Modem Products Supply Co. v. Drachenberg, 152 F.2d 203, 205 (6th Cir. 1945)
(Board of Appeals reversal of examiner, "very rigorous contest" over issuance strengthened the
presumption despite lack of involvement of other private parties); Folberth Auto Specialty Co. v.
Mayo-Skinner Mfg. Co., 292 F. 883, 891 (N.D. Ill. 1923); National Sponge Cushion Co. v. Rubber
Corp., 286 F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1961); Aghnides v. S.H. Kress & Co., 140 F. Supp. 582, 584
(M.D. N.C. 1956).
An interference proceeding results where two pending applications, or a pending application
and an issued patent, present claims to the same subject matter. An interference proceeding estab-
lishes entitlement to that subject matter by determining interpartes, between the conflicting claim-
ants, who is the first or prior inventor of that subject matter. 35 U.S.C. §§ 135, 141, 146 (1976).
See generally I CHISUM, supra note 9, § 2.04[71; 3 id. §§ 10.01, .02[51, .03[1].
94. See, e.g., Gaddis v. Calgon Corp., 506 F.2d 880, 885 (5th Cir. 1975) ("IPlertinent prior art
not considered by the Patent Office weakens the presumption of validity ...."); Howe v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 73, 78 (7th Cir. 1968); Filmor Process Corp, v. Spell-right Corp., 404
F.2d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
95. See, e.g., Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 972 (7th Cir. 1979)
("Furthermore, that presumption does not exist against evidence of prior art not before the Patent
Office."); Skirow v. Roberts Colonial House, Inc., 361 F.2d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1966); Felburn v.
New York Cent. R.R. Co., 350 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1965).
96. See, e.g., Globe Linings, Inc. v. Cornvallis, 555 F.2d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Even one
prior art reference not considered by the Patent Office may be sufficient to overcome the presump-
tion."); Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 823, 823-33 (D. D.C. 1978), afl'd,
628 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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presence in the file during an original application proceeding, is notper
se equated with due consideration of that reference by the Office. The
actual steps and procedures followed by the examiner with respect to
the reference are considered by courts in determining whether due con-
sideration has been given to a reference by the Office.
97
The close manner in which courts scrutinize the examiner's steps
and procedures to determine whether the presumption of validity has
attached is illustrated by Ceco Corp. v. Bliss & Laughlin Industries,
Inc .98 There, the district court refused to find a presumption of validity
with respect to the Erwin patent, which was not cited by the Office
during the prosecution of the original Cunningham patent in suit. In a
reissue application filed to provoke an interference with another patent,
the defendant's attorney had cited the Erwin patent to the Office. How-
ever, the attorney had not submitted a copy of the patent or a detailed
discussion of the references and distinguishing elements of the claimed
invention over that reference as required by the Manual of Patent Ex-
amining Procedures.99 Noting that the mere citation of the Erwin pat-
ent to the Office was insufficient to infer that the examiner duly
considered it and analyzed it, the court concluded that a presumption
of validity did not arise over the Erwin patent. The court then pro-
ceeded to find the Cunningham patent invalid partly on the basis of the
Erwin patent. °0 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting that there were no
official actions or papers of the examiner from which it could have been
inferred that he had ever acquired actual knowledge of the subject mat-
ter of the Erwin patent. 10
Similarly, the court in Lundy Electronics & Systems, Inc. v. Optical
Recognition Systems, Inc. 102 found a considerable weakening of the
presumption of validity with respect to a reference that had been,
again, merely cited to the examiner but not cited by him in any of his
97. See, e.g., Ropat Corp. v. West Bend Co., 382 F. Supp. 1030, 1034-35 (N.D. I11. 1974)
(patent cited by number only in preliminary amendment as one of 23 references; file history
showed "check mark" next to reference; presumption weakened by failure of Office to cite refer-
ence); Novelart Mfg. Co. v. Carlin Container Corp., 363 F. Supp. 58, 67 (D. N.J. 1973); Worthing-
ton v. Southern New Jersey Newspapers, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 443, 462-63 (D. N.J. 1970).
98. 186 U.S.P.Q. 114 (C.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 557 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977).
99. 186 U.S.P.Q. at 127. See MPEP, supra note 24, § 707.05(b). The court characterized the
discussion of the Erwin patent as "rather cryptic," and particularly noted that it did not point out
the patent's teaching of "telescoping U-shaped channel members in extension of a vertically ex-
tendable scaffold," which were critical to the alleged patentability of the Cunningham invention.
Id.
100. Id. at 128.
101. 557 F.2d at 691.
102. 362 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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official actions or papers. 0 3 The court examined the validity of the
patent in suit "independently and unaided by any presumption."'
' 0 4
Also illustrative of the extent to which courts analyze the actions of an
examiner is the fact that courts have split on whether the presumption
of validity arises over prior art contained in classes and subclasses
known to have been searched by the examiner but not specifically cited
or discussed by him. 05
Thus, the steps and procedures followed by an examiner in a reex-
amination must also be considered to determine whether a reexamina-
tion gives rise to the presumption of validity over the newly cited prior
art. The reexamination statute requires that prior art consisting of pat-
ents or printed publications which that person believes to have a bear-
ing on the patentability of any claim of a particular patent be provided
to the Office.10 6 The reexamination request must set forth the perti-
nency and manner of applying the cited prior art to every claim for
which reexamination is requested and this explanation becomes part of
the official file of the patent. 0 7 The new Rules of Practice further ex-
pand on the form and content of the request for reexamination and
require that the request contain: (1) a statement pointing out each sub-
stantial new question of patentability based on prior patents and
printed publications; (2) identification of every claim for which reex-
amination is requested, together with a detailed explanation of the per-
tinency and manner of applying the cited prior art to such claims, and,
if appropriate, the requester may distinguish the patent's claims over
cited prior art; and (3) a copy of the cited art, together with English
translations of the necessary and pertinent parts of non-English lan-
guage patents or printed publications.10
The requirement that a reexamination request include a copy of
the cited prior art, together with a detailed explanation of its perti-
nency, ensures that the examiner will duly consider the cited prior art
and thus avoids this obstacle to the raising of the presumption of valid-
103. Id. at 142.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkeley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1266-67 (8th
Cir. 1980) (presumption recognized); Panduit Corp. v. Burndy Corp., 517 F.2d 535, 538 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1975); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Berwick Industries, 393 F. Supp. 1230, 1234-35 (M.D.
Pa. 1975). But see Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. Crane Packing Co., 523 F.2d 452, 458 (7th Cir.
1975) (presumption not recognized); Borden, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp.
1178, 1202 (S.D. Tex. 1974); American Tube & Controls, Inc. v. General Fittings Co., 287 F.
Supp. 673, 679-80 (D. R.I. 1968).
106. 35 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West Sp. Supp. 1980). For the language of this provision, see note 29
supra.
107. 35 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Sp. Supp. 1980).
108. 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b)(l)-(3) (1981).
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ity as was the case in Ceco and in Lundy Electronics. However, those
aspects of the reexamination procedure relating to other prior art de-
crease the likelihood that courts will recognize the presumption of va-
lidity as arising over the cited prior art.
Although the statute provides that a reexamination be conducted
according to the procedures established for the initial examination of a
patent application, 0 9 the Office, in promulgating its rules, has acted
contrary to the statutory directive. The reexamination procedure dif-
fers from the original application procedure in the critical areas of the
scope of the search through the collections of prior art materials main-
tained by the Office, and in the application of all pertinent prior art of
record to the reexamined claims.
The difference in the scope of the search of the two procedures was
highlighted by Acting Commissioner of Patents Tegtmeyer, speaking
for the Office in the final promulgation of the rules covering reexami-
nation. Acting Commissioner Tegtmeyer stated:
Although no complete new search by the examiner is required,
the use of patents and printed publications in addition to those sub-
mitted by the requester is clearly indicated ....
While it is not intended that the examiners will routinely com-
plete a new search when conducting reexamination, the examiners
will be free to, and will, very likely, conduct additional searches and
cite and apply additional prior patents and publications when they
consider it is appropriate and beneficial to do so.'°
His hopeful comment that examiners can and will conduct additional
searches and cite and apply additional prior art is an unrealistic view of
the current capabilities of the Patent and Trademark Office. Examiners
are presently swamped by filings, beset by inadequate, antiquated, and
incomplete search facilities and informational sources and are held to
quality and performance standards in which elapsed time and applica-
tion disposals are emphasized. "' Under the Office rules and with such
operational conditions, it is unlikely that a full prior art search of the
type done for any original application will ever be conducted as part of
a reexamination.
The second difference between the reexamination and original ap-
plication procedures involves the extent to which other pertinent prior
109. 35 U.S.C.A. § 305 (West Sp. Supp. 1980).
110. 1007 OFFICIAL GAz. PAT. OFF. 30, 32, 34 (1981).
i1. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE EXAMINATION SYSTEM IN THE U.S.
PATENT OFFICE, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1961), reprinted in 2 RESEARCH STUDIES IN PATENT LAW
(Hein 1969).
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art of record will be applied to the reexamined claims. When deciding
whether a substantial new question of patentability exists, 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.515(a) permits consideration of other patents or printed publica-
tions, but does not require it insofar as prior art not relied upon in the
request is concerned." 1 2 It is possible that examiners may rely on this
aspect of the reexamination procedure to concentrate the reexamina-
tion too directly on just the newly cited references and to ignore prior
art previously made of record in the prosecution but not relied on in
the request.
These two differences between the original application procedure
and a reexamination lead to the possibility that the reexamination pro-
cedure will be found insufficient as a patentability analysis. The three-
part Graham analysis cannot be carried out without having a true pic-
ture of the complete scope and content of the pertinent prior art.' 3
The addition of a new reference has the potential for altering the im-
portance of information which the original application search was di-
rected to seek out. It may indicate a completely new area of inquiry or
that previously disregarded prior art has relevance as a secondary
teaching.
Unless a plenary search and consideration of all of the prior art of
record on reexamination is shown to be unnecessary to identify the per-
tinent prior art and to distinguish the claimed subject matter from that
art, a court asked to recognize the statutory presumption of validity
over newly cited prior art may well refuse to find that the presumption
has arisen. A court would base its refusal on a deficient application of
the Office's expertise to an incomplete record of the relevant prior art,
where it viewed such expertise in terms of the regular procedures for
examining original patent applications.
A reexamination requester can take steps to avoid this potential
difficulty. The requester can effect a prior art search in view of the
newly cited prior art patents and publications and supply a statement
of the results of the search to the Office. That statement should relate
the claims at issue in the reexamination to all the relevant prior art
patents or printed publications uncovered. Any 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(a)
statement should also relate the new references to all of the prior art
previously of record, separately and in any reasonable combination,
which would include both references cited by the examiner and refer-
ences supplied through a prior art statement accompanying the original
112. 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(a) (1981); 1007 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 30, 33 (1981).
113. See notes 9-15 supra.
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application. "14
The more thorough the reexamination procedures are made with
respect to the consideration of all the pertinent prior art, the more
likely it is that a trial court will find a proper application of the Graham
standard of patentability by the Office. This thoroughness would as-
sure judicial recognition of the presumption of validity over the newly
cited prior art references, and hence, enhance the presumption of valid-
ity attaching to the patent for purposes of any subsequent litigation.
Conversely, if a patent is found invalid upon reexamination, the likeli-
hood that the Office's decision will be upheld upon judicial review
would also be strengthened by evidence of thoroughness on the part of
the Office's due consideration of all the pertinent prior art.
Denial of Requests for Reexamination
The sole statutory criteria for determining whether to grant a reex-
amination request is whether a substantial new question of patentabil-
ity affecting any claim of the patent concerned is raised by the
request. 1 5 The Office rules reiterate that this determination will be
made with reference to the prior art cited in the reexamination request,
with or without consideration of other patents or printed publica-
tions." 6 Although the Office rules do provide for a statement by the
requester pointing out each substantial new question of patentability,
along with a detailed explanation of the pertinency and manner of ap-
plying the cited prior art to every claim for which reexamination is
requested,' '7 the satisfaction of those provisions apparently can be met
114. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.530(c) (1981).
115. 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b)(l) (1981).
116. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, SAMPLE CORRESPONDENCE
FORMS, 4-8 (1981) (reexamination). These forms are samples only. They contain no requirement
that a requestor supply anything other than simple conclusory statements. If these samples are
representative of what the Office will accept as procedurally sufficient, denial of a determination
under 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(a) (198 1) on the explicit basis of failure to satisfy the requirements of 37
C.F.R. § 1.5l0(b)(l), (2) (1981) may never occur.
117. The fee arrangement for reexamination confirms the view that the "substantial new ques-
tion" determination under 35 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (West Sp. Supp. 1980) is not examination or reex-
amination. 37 C.F.R. § 1.21(x) (1981) provides for payment of a $1,500 fee "[tjo file a request for
reexamination." See 1007 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 2 (1981); 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(a) (1981). When
no "substantial new question" is found, part of that fee is returned. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.26(c), 1.515(b)
(1981). In explaining why the refund provision was promulgated, Acting Commissioner of Pat-
ents and Trademarks Tegtmeyer stated:
Although a fixed fee system would be less complicated, it is felt that persons who
have not received a reexamination in response to their request should not be required to
pay the same amount as those who had the reexamination requested.
1007 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 3 (1981).
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rather easily and without reference to other art already of record. ' 8
The potential thus exists for a deliberate broad-brush treatment of a
newly cited reference whose effect may be subtle but significant on the
patentability of the claims of the patent for which reexamination is
requested.
Thus, courts can be expected to view critically the assertion that
the presumption of validity exists over prior art cited in a request for
reexamination which has been denied. The reexamination request pro-
cedure can be markedly narrower in scope than the original application
procedures and, hence, be found not to constitute a due application of
the Office's expertise from which the presumption of validity arises.'1 9
To maximize the possibility that the presumption of validity will
be recognized over prior art cited in a reexamination request, it would
be advantageous, if not necessary, to conform the reexamination re-
quest procedure with the original application procedure as much as
possible. Unfortunately, the Office has done exactly the opposite. A
determination of the presence of a "substantial new question of patent-
ability" strictly on the basis of prior art cited in the reexamination re-
quest, irrespective of the presence in the file of other prior art, will
prevent the presumption of validity from arising over the newly cited
prior art. Additionally, such a determination may be violative of the
Graham patentability standards that demand consideration of all the
available pertinent prior art. 20 The Office may aid in raising the pre-
sumption of validity over prior art cited in a denied reexamination re-
quest by vigorously insisting on an explicit and detailed statement on
the extent of the prior art search conducted and the differences between
the pertinent prior art found and the claims at issue. 121 The Office
could also withdraw Acting Commissioner Tegtmeyer's comment' 22
and order examiners to determine whether a "substantial new question
of patentability" exists in view of all of the prior art of record.
118. See text accompanying notes 9-15 supra.
119. If the requester is not the patent owner, a tendency to provide the minimum information
necessary to satisfy 37 C.F.R. § 1.510 (1981)will be expected if the newly cited prior art is other
than clearly anticipatory. Such a stance will maximize the requestor's later arguments in court
that no presumption should attach to the references he cited if the request is denied. It, therefore,
becomes incumbent upon the Office to require a thorough prior art search and a detailed discus-
sion of the similarities between the prior art and the claims of the patent at issue.
120. Acting Commissioner Tegtmeyer spoke in favor of a narrow prior art search by reexami-
nation request examiners. See note 117 supra.
121. 35 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (Sp. Supp. 1980). See note 33 supra.
122. 1007 OFFICIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 30, 33 (1981).
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SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS TO THE STATUTE AND RULES
The present reexamination procedure differs significantly from an
original exparte examination procedure. As discussed earlier, the re-
quired content of a reexamination request and the scope of prior art
considered in a reexamination fall far short of the amount of prior art
information that is sought out and considered in processing an original
application for a patent. The preceding analysis has shown that this
difference may well cause courts to refuse to recognize the presumption
of validity as arising over newly cited prior art that has been considered
in a reexamination.
The Office rules concerning both the requester's statement and the
patent owner's statement, if they are different parties, should be
amended to require consideration of all the prior art of record and not
just the newly uncovered prior art that gave rise to the reexamination
request. The requester should be required to conduct a new or updated
search, in light of the newly uncovered prior art, and include the results
of that search, along with copies of all the pertinent references, in his
request. 123 No requirement for such an extensive search presently ex-
ists. The requester should also be required to compare the claims at
issue with all the pertinent prior art and to analyze the differences that
support his position. Presently, it is up to the requester's discretion
whether to make such a comparison and analysis and present it to the
Office. 124 Although a patent owner is required to compare and analyze
his patent in view of the newly uncovered prior art if he files a state-
ment with the Office, 125 he should be required to consider all the perti-
nent prior art of record in making his comparison and analysis.
Examiners should also be required to explicitly state the reasons
for denying a reexamination. The denial should include a complete list
of all the prior art considered by the examiner as well as detailed rea-
sons why no substantial new question of patentability exists. A further
search by the examiner would be generally unnecessary if a further
search was conducted by the requester as proposed, but if the examiner
conducts a further search, his statement should mention that fact, set-
ting out all the specific references reviewed.
Presently, a review of a denial of a reexamination request may be
obtained only by a petition to the Commissioner. 126 To instill more
123. See MPEP, supra note 24, § 708.02 for a discussion of the scope that such a search would
take.
124. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b)(2) (1981).
125. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.530(c) (1981).
126. See note 34 supra.
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certainty in the refusal decision, an internal Quality Review 27 should
be undertaken by the Office for most, if not all, denials where the pat-
ent owner is the requester. The fact of such review should also be
made of record in the case. If a denial is found questionable, the reex-
amination request should then be reviewed by a different examiner.' 28
The Office Solicitor might serve as an ombudsman for the public in lieu
of the patent owner requester on this second review if it appears that a
better application of the newly cited art could be formulated. Such
action by the Solicitor would be consistent with the Commissioner's
power to initiate a reexamination without a request.
129
These proposed changes would not significantly increase the work-
load of the Office. If the requester is required to complete a thorough
prior art search before filing the reexamination request, Office delay
should be minimal. Use of the Quality Review procedure for denials of
patent owner requests, if too cumbersome and time consuming, might
be replaced by a Group Director review, or a review by the Solicitor or
the Assistant Commissioner for Patents. The statutory three month
limitation on the processing of a reexamination request 30 would re-
quire making an initial decision in two months, so as to leave thirty
days for some type of review. Conceivably, the review time might be
reduced to twenty days, a standard period for action in the Office rules.
Alternatively, Congress could be approached to extend the three month
period an additional month in order to permit adequate consideration
of a request and review of the Office's tentative response.
These proposed changes would impart to the reexamination proce-
dure those characteristics of the original application procedure that are
necessary for the presumption of validity to arise. As such, these
changes would permit the presumption of validity to arise over newly
cited prior art which was found not to raise a substantial new question
of patentability.
The procedure for conducting a reexamination can most directly
be improved by requiring that all of the prior art of record should be
considered, and that such consideration should be explicitly made of
record. The examiner should be afforded the time to conduct addi-
tional prior art searches and should be encouraged to exercise his dis-
cretion in initiating these searches. Again, requiring the requester to
127. See MPEP, supra note 24, § 1308.03.
128. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.525(a) (1981).
129. See note 31 supra.
130. 35 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (West Sp. Supp. 1980). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(c) (1981).
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conduct a new search and present its result would aid greatly in assur-
ing due consideration by the examiner of all the pertinent prior art.
An overall improvement of the reexamination procedure would be
an explicit statement by Congress as to the exact legal consequence of a
denial of a reexamination request or of a reexamination that finds a
patent valid. If the statutory presumption of validity is to arise over
newly cited prior art in denied requests, explicit statutory language to
that effect should be enacted, and the conditions under which the pre-
sumption will arise should be set. It appears that a broad scope of prior
art must be considered by the Office before the presumption of validity
will arise so that this requirement should be incorporated in the statute.
Failure to do so leaves open the question of whether the desired effi-
cacy of the new reexamination procedure will be realized.
CONCLUSION
The new reexamination procedure provides a mechanism for elim-
inating the long-standing problem of attempting to assess the validity
of an issued patent after a previously unknown prior art reference
comes to light. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism appears
to be seriously undermined by the uncertainty that presently exists as to
the significance of the outcome of a reexamination request in subse-
quent litigation. The improvements suggested here are aimed at reduc-
ing this uncertainty by ensuring that the outcome of a reexamination
request strengthens the presumption of validity that attaches to an is-
sued patent. In this manner, the intent of Congress and the patent bar
to streamline the patent system in order to bolster innovation in this
country will be carried out.
